

Message Text

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10/53

ACTION MBFR-03

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-12 ADP-00 CIAE-00 PM-09 H-02 INR-09

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 USIA-12

NEA-10 GAC-01 SAJ-01 OIC-04 T-03 AEC-11 AECE-00

ACDA-19 OMB-01 INRE-00 RSR-01 /156 W

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P R 171510 Z MAR 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8099

INFO SECDEF/ WASHDC PRIORITY

MBFR CAPITALS 265

USNMR/ SHAPE

USLOSACLANT

USCINCEUR

USDEL SALT TWO II

USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 2152

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADD SUBJECT AND TAGS INFORMATION)

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: MBFR AD HOC GROUP MEETING MARCH 16.

GENEVA FOR DISTO

NATO TAKE AS PRIORITY

FROM US REP MBFR

1. CHAIRMAN CALLED ATTENTION OF GROUP TO MARCH 16 DAILY TELEGRAPH INTERVIEW BY SERGE NABOKOFF WITH SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS WHICH, AS CHAIRMAN PUT IT, " EXCEEDED NAC INSTRUCTIONS." HE WONDERED WHETHER IT WOULD BE FEASIBLE TO CONTACT BRUSSELS. US REP INDICATED THAT ACCORDING TO WORD FROM BRUSSELS, JOURNALIST HAD ABUSED SYG' S CONFIDENCE, AND THAT STEPS WERE BEING TAKEN IN BRISSELS TO COUNTER-CONFIDENTIAL

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ACT THE INTERVIEW. US REP MADE GENERAL POINT THAT IN A MULTILATERAL ENTERPRISE OF THIS SORT, GIVEN THE NUMEROUS LEAKS AND EXPRES-

SIONS OF DIVERGENT VIEWS, THE ONLY WAY TO PROCEED WAS TO HEW CLOSELY TO THE AGREED LINE WITH THE EAST, TELL EASTERN REPS THIS WAS THE SOLE AGREED ALLIED LINE, DOGGEDLY REPEAT IT TO EASTERN REPS, AND ADVISE THEM TO IGNORE ANYTHING THEY MIGHT HEAR THAT CONFLICTED. GIVEN THE OVERALL SITUATION WITH NUMEROUS PRESS LEAKS, THE POSSIBILITY OF SECURITY LEAKS WITH SO MANY GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED, AND THE UNFORTUNATE LACK OF DISCIPLINE ON THE PART OF SOME DELS AND SOME GOVERNMENTS IN ADVANCING THEIR OWN VIEWPOINT, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD UNAVOIDABLY BE QUASI PUBLIC AND THAT TACTICAL FINESSE AND CONFIDENTIALITY WOULD HAVE TO BE REPLACED BY SHEER PERSISTENCE.

2. CHAIRMAN INVITED NETHERLANDS REP TO REPORT ON MARCH 16 DISCUSSION BETWEEN NETHERLANDS, US, SOVIET AND HUNGARIAN REPS. NETHERLANDS REP DESCRIBED CONVERSATION AS AN INCONCLUSIVE PROBE. NO MOVEMENT WAS REGISTERED ON THE SOVIET SIDE. THE CONVERSATIONS WOULD CONTINUE ON MARCH 20. HE FELT THERE WERE STILL DEFINITE POSSIBILITIES FOR PROBING IN THE ALLIED FORMULA AND THAT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE AT THIS STAGE TO ASK FOR DISCUSSION IN THE NAC. NETHERLANDS REP HAD STRESSED AT OPENING OF CONVERSATION THAT HUNGARIAN PARTICIPATION ISSUE SHOULD BE KEPT OPEN UNTIL THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES COULD BE DIRECTLY ADDRESSED AND DEALT WITH. THIS WAS ALREADY A CONSIDERABLE CONCESSION ON THE PART OF THE ALLIES. THE EASTERN REPS HAD NOT TAKEN THIS POINT UP. THERE WAS POSSIBILITY, HOWEVER, THEY WOULD DO SO AT THE NEXT MEETING. KHLESTOV HAD STRESSED THAT PURPOSE OF CONSULTATIONS WAS TO PREPARE FOR SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS SUBSTANCE WAS REDUCTIONS OF FORCES. KHLESTOV HAD EXPRESSED THE FEELING THAT SOME ALLIES DID NOT SHARE THIS VIEW AND THAT ALLIES' EFFORT TO POSTPONE A DECISION OF HUNGARIAN STATUS WAS AIMED AT CREATING DIFFICULTY AND DELAYING CONSIDERATION OF REDUCTIONS. ALLIED REPS CATEGORICALLY REJECTED THIS INTERPRETATION. EASTERN REPS HAD ADVANCED NO NEW PROPOSALS. THEY HAD RETURNED REPEATEDLY TO PROPOSAL MADE AT EARLIER MEETING THAT THERE SHOULD BE A LIST OF 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, FOLLOWED BY A STATEMENT THAT THESE 11 PARTICIPANTS COULD COOPT FURTHER PARTICIPANTS. WHEN ASKED WHETHER SUCH COOPTION WOULD BE FROM THE GROUP OF SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS, EASTERN REPS HAD INDICATED THAT THIS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE THE CASE. AFTER SOME FURTHER QUESTIONING THEY HAD MENTIONED FRANCE. IT WAS THEREFORE THE CONCLUSION OF THE NETHERLANDS REP THAT THE EAST MOST ASSUREDLY

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WANTED THIS POINT COVERED IN THE PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS. ALLIED REPS HAD ADVANCED NO NEW PROPOSALS OF THEIR OWN. KHLESTOV HAD SAID THAT A TRULY NEUTRAL PROPOSAL MUST BE MIDWAY BETWEEN TWO POSITIONS. CONVERSATION HAD ENDED WITH KVITSINSKIY SAYING THAT EASTERN REPS WOULD NEED TIME TO REFLECT ON WHAT HAD BEEN SAID.

3. US REP THEN CIRCULATED ACCOUNT OF MARCH 16 MEETING (TEXT CONTAINED SEPTTEL) AND REPORT ON MARCH 15 BILATERAL MEETING WITH SOVIET DELEGATION MEMBER KVITSINSKIY. US REP EXPLAINED THAT MARCH 15

CONVERSATION REPRESENTED ESSENTIALLY FISHING EXPEDITION BY KVITSINSKIY; AND THAT EVERYTHING HE HAD SAID THEN HAD COME OUT AGAIN DURING MARCH 16 TALKS WITH NETHERLANDS AND HUNGARIAN REPS. WITH REGARD TO MARCH 16 CONVERSATION, US REP COMMENTED THAT EASTERN REPS HAD DELIVERED LONG HARANGUE AGAINST ALLEGED NON- NEUTRALITY OF ALLIED PROPOSALS. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY HAD NOT MOVED FROM THEIR POSITION THAT HUNGARY SHOULD BE SPECIAL PARTICIPANT. NEVERTHELESS, US REP DID NOT CONCLUDE THAT EASTERN REPS HAD YET TAKEN A DEFINITIVE POSITION, AND HE BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO MAKE ANY DEFINITIVE ASSESSMENT OF EASTERN POSTURE.

4. UK REP COMMENTED THAT EASTERN SIDE WAS SHOWING A WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN A DIALOGUE, ALTHOUGH NOT YET A CONSTRUCTIVE ONE, HE ASKED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY INDICATIONS THAT SOVIETS MIGHT BE PLAYING FOR TIME WHILE WAITING FOR NEW INSTRUCTIONS. HE ALSO NOTED THAT ALLIED REPS HAD CHARACTERIZED NATO PROPOSAL AS LEAVING OPEN THE STATUS OF HUNGARY UNTIL THE NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE UK REP AGREED THAT THIS MIGHT BE THE EFFECT OF THE ALLIED PROPOSAL, HE WONDERED IF THE POSSIBILITY OF A RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE IN EXPLORATIONS SHOULD BE FORECLOSED. ADDITIONALLY, UK REP NOTED THAT REPS HAD NOT PUT FORWARD COUNTER- ARGUMENT DISCUSSED MARCH 15 AD HOC GROUP: NAMELY, ENUMERATION OF THE SEVEN SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS PLUS SOME FORMULA TO COVER THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS WITHOUT NAMING THEM, THUS IN EFFECT STANDING ON ITS HEAD THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO LIST FIRST ALL 19 PARTICIPANTS AND THEN THE ELEVEN AGREED DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

5. IN REPLY TO THESE POINTS, US REP REMARKED THAT ALLIED REPS HAD DELIBERATELY DECIDED NOT TO ASK SOVIETS FOR AN OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO ALLIED PROPOSAL. IF ALLIED REPS ASKED FOR A RESPONSE, THEY WOULD PROBABLY RECEIVE ONE, BUT IT WOULD BE NEGATIVE AND DEFINITELY SO IF TO EXTENT OF CUTTING OFF PRESENT DISCUSSION. WITH RESPECT TO SECOND
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ACTION MBFR-03

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-12 ADP-00 CIAE-00 PM-09 H-02 INR-09

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P R 171510 Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8100
INFO SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
MBFR CAPITALS 266
USNMR SHAPE
USLOSACLANT
USCINCEUR
USDEL SALT TWO II
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 VIENNA 2152

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADD SUBJECT AND TAGS INFORMATION)

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: MBFR AD HOC GROUP MEETING MARCH 16.

GENEVA FOR DSTO; NATO TAKE AS PRIORITY

FROM US REP MBFR

UK POINT, US REP POINTED OUT THAT FIRST PRESENTATION TO THE EAST ON MARCH 13 HAD MADE CLEAR THAT HUNGARIAN PARTICIPATION ISSUE COULD BE RESOLVED EITHER IN THE CONSULTATIONS OR LATER ON. NOTHING ALLIED REPS HAD SAID SUBSEQUENTLY REALLY FORECLOSED EITHER OPTION. WITH RESPECT TO LAST UK POINT, NETHERLANDS REP NOTED THAT UK'S SUGGESTION WAS NOT, OF COURSE, AN ALLIED PROPOSAL AS SUCH, AND THAT ALLIED REPS HAD NOT FELT THEY COULD ADVANCE THE IDEA AS THEIR OWN EXCEPT POSSIBLY IN THE PROPER CONTEXT. US REP
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AGREED THAT APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY HAD NOT PRESENTED ITSELF, BUT HE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO RAISING IT IF SUCH OPPORTUNITY OCCURRED.

6. GREEK REP OBSERVED THAT SOVIET IDEA OF LISTING 19 PARTICIPANTS AND 11 AGREED DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WITHOUT LISTING THE SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS, WAS TAKING ON THE SHAPE OF A COUNTER-PROPOSAL. AD HOC GROUP WOULD THEREFORE HAVE TO TAKE A CLOSE LOOK AT IT. UK COUNTER- SUGGESTION (LISTING 7 SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS ONLY) WOULD CERTAINLY BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS. IF ALLIES PUT IT FORWARD, SOVIETS WOULD REJECT IT. HOWEVER, IF THEY WISHED TO ADVANCE IT, ALLIED REPS WOULD HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO SHOW HOW IT WOULD WORK. WERE ALLIES IN FACT READY TO DO THIS? GREEK REP FELT THERE SHOULD BE COMPLETE CLARITY WITHIN AD HOC GROUP AS TO WHAT ALLIES COULD ACCEPT. HE HIMSELF HAD STRONG MISGIVINGS AS TO SOVIET, 19 PLUS 11, PROPOSAL AND ALSO ON THE OPEN OPTION IDEA.

7. US REP AGREED. IN HIS OPINION, SOVIET IDEA OF LISTING 19 AND 11 HAD BEEN PRESENTED AS A FACE- SAVING DEVICE FOR THE ALLIE. IN EFFECT, HUNGARY WOULD BE A SPECIAL PARTICIPANT, BUT THIS WOULD NOT BE SPECIFICALLY STATED IN PAPER. US REP WENT ON TO SUGGEST THAT ONE COULD VISUALIZE INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL PARAGRAPH IN ALLIED TEXT OF MARCH 13 WHICH WOULD SAY THAT OTHER PARTIES MIGHT BE INVITED TO JOIN THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IF THEY WISHED TO DO SO AND IF THERE WERE CONSENSUS AMONG THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS THAT SUCH OTHER PARTIES COULD BE INCLUDED. THE STATUS OF THE 7 SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE TO BE CLEARLY DEFINED. SUCH A FORMULATION COULD BE USEFUL FOR BARGAINING PURPOSES IN THAT IT SERVED TWO INTERESTS: THE EVIDENT SOVIET INTERST IN BRING FRANCE INTO THE TALKS, AND SOVIET INTEREST IN BRINGING OTHER COUNTRIES INTO THE GROUP OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AT A LATER STAGE IF HUNGARY WERE DEFINITELY TO COME IN. SUCH A FORMULATION, WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITHOUT ANY COMMITMENT ON ANYONE' S PART, WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF MITIGATING THE SINGLING OUT OF HUNGARY AND WOULD AVOID ANY SINGLING OUT OF ITALY BY THE OTHER SIDE.

8. FRG NOTED WITH INTERST SOVIET CHARACTERIZATION OF ALLIED PROPOSALS AS BEING BASED ON GEOGRAPHIC CONSIDERATIONS, WHILE EASTERN PROPOSALS WERE BASED ON SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS. FRG REP NOTED THAT KHLESTOV HAD OFTEN STATED HE DID NOT WANT TO GO
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INTO QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE IN THE CONSULTATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, HE WAS ACTUALLY DEFINING THE IDEA OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY THROUGH THE EXCLUSION OF HUNGARY. FRG REP THOUGHT THAT THE AD HOC GROUP SHOULD CAREFULLY CONSIDER THIS POINT, A POINT OF SUBSTANCE, WHICH COULD HAVE FAR- REACHING IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. US REP AGREED THAT SOVIETS WERE CLEARLY CAUGHT IN AN INCONSISTENCY, SINCE THEY ALSO HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO WHICH KHLESTOV REFERRED, NOT TO DISCUSS SUBSTANCE DURING THESE EXPLORATIONS.

9. TURKISH REP FOCUSED ON REPEATED SOVIET REFERENCES IN MARCH 16 CONVERSATION TO THE " SOUTHERN FLANK." HE WONDERED IF THE SOVIETS WERE INTERESTED IN BRINGING IN NOT ONLY ITALY, BUT GREECE AND TURKEY AS WELL. HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE BEST TO DEFINE THE STATUS OF THE FLANK COUNTRIES AS CLEARLY AS POSSIBLE TO AVOID FUTURE PRESSURES IN NEGOTIATIONS TO INCLUDE THE FLANK COUNTRIES. US REP DOUBTED WHETHER SOVIETS WERE IN THIS WAY TRYING TO BRING IN GREECE AND TURKEY. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE KIND OF FORMULATION THAT HAD BEEN RAISED BY THE EAST ON ADDING NEW COUNTRIES TO THE LIST OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY A SPECIFIC LISTING OF FLANK COUNTRIES AS SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS. A CLEAR LINE, IN EFFECT, COULD BE DRAWN BETWEEN DIRECT AND SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS WHICH COULD BE CROSSED ONLY AT THE REQUEST OF ONE OF THE SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS AND BY A CONSENSUS OF DIRECT

PARTICIPANTS.

10. UK REP SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE IDEA OF TURNING SOVIET PROPOSAL ON ITS HEAD BY LISTING ONLY 7 SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS WAS NOT A " UK PROPOSAL" BUT MERELY A SUGGESTION FOR A TACTICAL COUNTER- MOVE. HE WENT ON TO NOTE THAT THE INCREASINGLY FREQUENT MENTION OF FRANCE BY THE OTHER SIDE PUT THE ALLIES IN A SOMEWHAT DELICATE POSITION. FRANCE DID NOT WANT TO TAKE PART IN THE NEGOTIATIONS; ANY CHANGE IN THIS POSITION SHOULD BE AT THE INITIATIVE OF FRANCE ITSELF. THE ALLIES IN VIENNA SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS ABOUT PACKAGE DEALS BASED ON THE POSSIBILITY THAT FRANCE MIGHT JOIN THE TALKS, SINCE THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT COULD ALWAYS DECLARE THAT SUCH A DEAL WAS BASED ON NO AUTHORITY.
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ACTION MBFR-03

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-12 ADP-00 CIAE-00 PM-09 H-02 INR-09

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ACDA-19 OMB-01 INRE-00 RSR-01 /156 W

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P R 171510 Z MAR 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8101

INFO SECDEF/ WASHDC PRIORITY

MBFR CAPITALS 267

USNMR/ SHAPE

USLOSACLANT

USCINCEUR

USDEL SALT TWO II

USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 VIENNA 2152

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADD SUBJECT AND TAGS INFORMATION)

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: MBFR AD HOC GROUP MEETING MARCH 16.

11. NORWEGIAN REP AGREED WITH UK REP REGARDING THE NEED FOR CAUTION ON ANY FORMULA POSSIBLY INVOLVING FRANCE. US REP NOTED THAT

ALLIED REPS HAD CLEARLY INDICATED TO THE EAST THAT ALLIES WERE INTERESTED IN DEFINING THE STATUS OF THE 19 PARTICIPANTS NOW IN VIENNA AND THAT FRANCE WAS NOT UP FOR DISCUSSION NOW. THERE WAS NO THOUGHT OF ANY SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO FRANCE.

12. FRG REP PROPOSED THAT IT MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE IN THE COMING WEEK TO CLEARLY CATALOG THE VARIOUS POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS NOW ON THE TABLE: A) THE 11 PLUS 7 PLUS 1 FORMULA CONTAINED IN THE ALLIED PAPER OF MARCH 13, TOGETHER WITH POSSIBLE WAYS OF TRYING TO MITIGATE THE SINGLING OUT OF HUNGARY; B) THE SOVIET SUGGESTION FOR
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LISTING 19 PLUS 11 PARTICIPANTS WITH NO MENTION OF HUNGARY OR THE 7 SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS, AND THE UK MIRROR IMAGE OF THIS PROPOSAL (LIST OF 7 SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS ONLY, WITH NO MENTION OF HUNGARY); C) POSSIBILITY OF CO-OPTION OF ADDITIONAL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, WHICH WAS EMERGING AS THE BASIS FOR A PREFERRED SOVIET SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM.

13. UK REP RAISED QUESTION OF CHAIRMAN'S WEEKLY REPORT TO THE NAC AND SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO HIGHLIGHT THE DELICATE PROBLEM OF FRANCE. CHAIRMAN ASKED HOW US REP WOULD CHARACTERIZE THE CURRENT SITUATION. US REP THOUGHT ALLIED POSITION COULD BE DESCRIBED IN FOLLOWING WAY: ALLIES WERE NOT PRESSING AT THIS TIME FOR INCLUSION OF HUNGARY AS DIRECT PARTICIPANT FROM THE OUTSET. EXPLORATION WAS UNDER WAY TO SEE WHETHER ISSUE COULD BE KEPT OPEN ARGUING THAT HUNGARY SHOULD BE SPECIAL PARTICIPANT FROM THE OUTSET. EAST HAD NOT DEPARTED FROM INITIAL POSITION NOR HAD ALLIES DEPARTED FROM THEIR AGREED POSITION. HOWEVER, IT APPEARED THAT THE EAST WAS STILL SEARCHING FOR FORMULATIONS.

14. US REP PROPOSED THAT DRAFT OF CHAIRMAN'S REPORT BE CIRCULATED TO MEMBERS OF THE AD HOC GROUP FOR COMMENT BEFORE BEING SENT TO BRUSSELS. US REP SAID HE WAS BOTHERED BY THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOME DELEGATIONS IN NATO WOULD FEEL THAT THE CURRENT ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EAST HAD ADVANCED TO A MORE CONCLUSIVE PHASE THAT HE FELT WAS IN REALITY THE CASE. FRG REP SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF EDITING CHAIRMAN'S REPORT IN THIS SENSE AND GROUP AGREED TO EXAMINE REPORT AT NEXT SESSION MARCH 19.

15. DANISH REP ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM DANISH FOREIGN MINISTRY INFORMED AD HOC GROUP THAT ROMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD BE VISITING COPENHAGEN ON MARCH 21. HE SAID THAT THE AGENDA FOR DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN ROMANIAN AND DANISH FOREIGN MINISTERS INCLUDED AN ITEM ON MBFR. HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO RAISE THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE AD HOC GROUP AND OBTAIN THEIR REACTIONS:

- A) HAD ANY OTHER NATO COUNTRY RECEIVED A VISIT BY AN EAST EUROPEAN MINISTER SINCE THE MBFR EXPLORATORY TALKS BEGAN;
- B) HAD MBFR BEEN MENTIONED IN COMMUNIQUES FOLLOWING ANY SUCH VISITS?

C) ASSUMING THAT THE ROMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER DID NOT ACCEPT THE TERM MBFR IN A JOINT COMMUNIQUE, WHAT OTHER SUBSTITUTE TERM DID MEMBERS OF THE AD HOC GROUP THINK WOULD BE APPROPRIATE?
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16. CANADIAN REP NOTED THAT HUNGARIAN VICE PREMIER AND FOREIGN MINISTER HAD VISITED CANADA ON MARCH 12. HE WAS NOT FULLY INFORMED, HOWEVER, AND DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE SUBJECT OF MBFR HAD IN FACT COME UP. US REP SUGGESTED THAT DANISH FOREIGN MINISTRY MIGHT WISH TO CHECK DIRECTLY THROUGH THEIR EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. NO OTHER REP HAD ANY VISIT TO REPORT.

17. WITH RESPECT TO TERM " MBFR," US REP THOUGHT ROMANIANS WHO USED THE TERM FREELY, MIGHT CONCEIVABLY ACCEPT IT IN A COMMUNIQUE. IF ROMANIA DID NOT ACCEPT " MBFR," HE SUGGESTED REFERENCE TO " CURRENT DISCUSSIONS IN VIENNA" SINCE ANY OTHER SUBSTITUTE COULD UNDERCUT ALLIED POSITION ON DESIGNATION OF THE TALKS. FRG REP SUPPORTED THIS SUGGESTION, NOTING THAT IN RECENT CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN FRG OFFICIALS AND ROMANIAN DEPUTY MINISTER, LATTER HAD USED TERM " MBFR" FREELY. UK REP SUGGESTED USING STILL BROADER TERM, TO THE EFFECT THAT " MINISTERS REVIEWED CURRENT MULTILATERAL EAST" WEST SECURITY SUBJECTS." DANISH REP SAID HE WOULD REPLY TO HIS AUTHORITIES THAT MEMBERS OF AD HOC GROUP PREFERRED THE TERM MBFR. OTHERWISE HE WOULD RECOMMEND SOMETHING LIKE " CURRENT MULTILATERAL TALKS ON SECURITY."

18. US, ITALIAN, BELGIAN, AND TURKISH REP SREPORTED RECENT BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH ROMANIAN REP (CONSTANTINESCU). ONLY POINT OF INTEREST IN THESE MEETINGS HAD BEEN EVIDENCE IN MEETING WITH US REP OF ROMANIAN DESIRE TO CHANGE PARA 6 OF PROCEDURES PAPER ON SPEAKING RIGHTS. ROMANIANS WISHED TO COMBINE PARAS ON CIRCULATION OF DOCUMENTS AND RIGHT TO SPEAK SO AS TO GIV ALL PARTICIPANTS EQUAL RIGHTS. US REP REPORTED THAT KVVIT-SINSKIY HAD MADE SIMILAR POINT IN MARCH 15 CONVERATION WITH HIM. FRG RP BRIEFLY MENTIONED CONVERSATION WITH POLISH REP (STRULAK) IN WHICH HE HAD SHOWN INTEREST IN EXCHANGING GENERAL IDEAS ON AGENDA. HUMES

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